The first fault Stakelogic found was visible for two days. The weakness behind it had a much longer reach. When Stakelogic BV reported that *Tiger Temple 88* let another slot cycle begin after 1.97 seconds—below Great Britain’s 2.5-second minimum—the Gambling Commission asked how the supplier had checked its other games. A portfolio retest found 15 more that had breached the same rule during various periods between October 2021 and October 2025. The regulator traced the inaccurate timing checks to a decidedly analogue tool: a manual stopwatch. Gambling Commission public statement

The case is not evidence that every one of those games ran too fast throughout four years, or that the Commission measured harm to their players. It is a sharper product question: when a rule is measured in fractions of a second, what happens if the assurance process cannot reliably resolve that fraction? Stakelogic agreed to pay £122,835 in lieu of a financial penalty, plus the Commission’s investigation costs, as part of a regulatory settlement announced on 25 June 2026. Calling the £122,835 a conventional fine would misstate the published outcome. Regulatory action record · Public statement

A two-day fault exposed a portfolio question

The public statement places the *Tiger Temple 88* non-compliance between 28 and 30 May 2025. It says Stakelogic discovered the issue on the first date but left the game live until a fix was deployed on the second. The Commission treated that delay as an aggravating factor: suspending the game at discovery would have reduced the period in which customers could encounter it. Stakelogic had corrected this initial fault by the time it notified the regulator. Commission findings and settlement factors

The regulator then asked for the scope and cause, and Stakelogic retested its entire portfolio offered to the Great Britain market. That found another 15 non-compliant games. The published range of shortfalls was 0.001 to 0.675 seconds below the required interval; many missed it by 0.042 seconds or less. Those figures are not a list of measured player losses. They show why a test that looks adequate to a human observer may be too coarse for the rule it is supposed to enforce. Commission press release · Public statement

The public record is careful about time. The 15 other games were available during *various periods* within the four-year window; it does not assign each game a continuous four-year breach. It also says the supplier disabled all games available to the GB market once the wider scope became clear. That response matters, but it does not erase the Commission’s separate criticism that the initial incident did not trigger a prompt portfolio-wide review. Regulatory statement

What exactly has to last 2.5 seconds?

The rule, known as RTS 14D, starts its clock when a player begins a slot game and stops it only when the next game cycle *can be commenced*. At least 2.5 seconds must separate those moments. The same standard requires a fresh release-and-press of the start control, or an equivalent action, for each cycle. It is not merely a requirement that a reel animation look slow enough. Gambling Commission RTS 14D

That endpoint is important. A tester who times only the visible reel motion might miss when the next-round control actually becomes available. This is a product-testing implication of the standard, not a published finding about the precise stopwatch procedure Stakelogic used. The Commission’s statement attributes the errors to manual timing checks and says the method is open to significant inaccuracy; it does not release the company’s full test protocol or individual timing logs. RTS 14D wording · Regulatory action detail

Nor is this the same rule as an online slot’s stake ceiling. A game can be within its permitted stake for a player’s age group and still start its next cycle too soon. Our report on Britain’s slot stake limits separates the money committed inside one cycle from the timing between cycles. The ban on automated repeat play is a third control: our autoplay account explains why a fresh player action is required, even if a game’s clock itself is compliant.

The uncomfortable gap between testing and assurance

Britain’s games-testing framework is not simply “someone presses spin and watches.” Licensees submit game and random-number-generator test results, with testing by an approved test house before release. The Commission describes those reports as assurance for new games and major updates. Yet the Stakelogic statement specifically identifies inadequate internal quality-assurance checks and incident management. The existence of a test-report regime did not make a supplier’s own measurement and escalation controls irrelevant. Commission guidance on games test reports · Case findings

There is no public basis here for accusing an unnamed test house of missing the breach. The regulator has not identified a laboratory, published its work or said which check should have caught each affected title. The supported conclusion is narrower: Stakelogic’s timing practice was inaccurate, and its internal response to the first discovery did not promptly establish whether the same practice had affected the rest of the portfolio. Commission public statement

That distinction has an operational consequence for suppliers and casino operators. The game shown in a casino lobby is only the front layer of a longer delivery chain. Our guide to how games reach a casino lobby maps the hand-offs, while the Commission says business-to-consumer licensees using a business-to-business supplier must still keep their own games register current. A supplier’s correction and an operator’s distribution record are related tasks, not the same file. Games-register guidance

What the settlement did—and did not—resolve

The Commission says Stakelogic accepted that its processes fell short and committed to significant changes in quality assurance, incident management and its wider compliance framework. The public statement records the supplier’s cooperation, early acceptance and decision to disable all GB games after it understood the full scope as mitigating factors. Against those, it set the two-day delay for *Tiger Temple 88* and the late portfolio-wide review. The published settlement includes the £122,835 payment in lieu, a statement of facts and a separate contribution to investigation costs. Commission settlement statement

What the public record cannot measure

The regulator introduced the speed rule in 2021 because its research associated faster game cycles with increased consumer risk. That policy rationale should not be stretched into a claim that this case established how many customers were harmed, what they spent, or how much the timing errors changed their behaviour. The published case does not provide those measurements. Commission press release · RTS 14 design aim

What the record does establish is a failure of *measurement and escalation*. A half-second miss was obvious enough to start the investigation; smaller misses became visible only when the supplier examined the whole GB portfolio. The Commission’s practical questions for operators are pointed: how are spins measured, how is accuracy assured, and does one failed title trigger checks of other titles built or tested the same way? Those are the useful questions this case leaves on the workbench, long after the original game was fixed. Commission’s good-practice questions